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"Congress shall make no law ... " or "nor shall any state ... deny 
to any person ... the equal protection of the laws." In focusing on 
the question of interpretation, the authors emphasize the ability of 
our constitutional system to deduce from broad general principles a 
resolution of issues appropriate to the time and circumstances. 
A final segment deals with constitutional law in times of mili-
tary or foreign crisis, illustrating both the power and the limits of 
constitutional interpretation. This section emphasizes the constitu-
tional issues of the Civil War and of World War II. One might have 
wished for a discussion of other, more contemporary crises, in 
which constitutional interpretation helped to resolve serious polit-
ical problems-for example, Watergate. 
The Constitution will soon be guiding us into a third century of 
national government. The method of interpretation which has en-
sured such durability, when constitutions around the world have 
changed and changed again during that period, is certainly worthy 
of study. This book centers on that process of interpretation, rather 
than on particular interpretations present or past, and thus should 
contribute measurably to the student's knowledge of our govern-
mental system. It is neither a manual for lawyers nor a reference 
work for historians, but rather an excellent text for students of the 
art of government. 
JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS-BEHAV-
IORAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN APPELLATE 
COURTS. Edited by Sheldon Goldman' and Charles M. 
Lamb.2 Lexington, Ky.: The University Press of Kentucky. 
1986. Pp. 294. $30.00. 
Thomas P. Lewis 3 
The political scientists who wrote the twelve essays in this 
book are justifiably described in the overleaf as "major scholars of 
judicial behavior." Their contributions, though published here for 
the first time, do not form a tightly cohesive whole; the thread that 
holds them together is their common focus on dissenting opinions 
in cases decided at the appellate level of the federal and state court 
systems. The editors explain that the book is aimed at a diverse 
audience of students and scholars in political science, social psy-
I. Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts. 
2. Associate Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Buffalo. 
3. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. 
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chology, and law; that their purpose is, through quantitative analy-
sis, "to explore the type, frequency, intensity, and especially the 
causes and phenomena related to conflict and consensus" in the ap-
pellate courts; and that their hope is that "the studies on judicial 
behavior can illuminate both what we know and need to know 
about how appellate courts function." 
When I was invited to review this book it was evident that I 
had not been chosen for my expertise in quantitative analysis of ju-
dicial behavior. I was chosen, I gather, on the theory that some-
times an outsider's perspective is valuable. Unfortunately, my 
assignment proved to be more difficult than I had expected. I found 
myself reading and rereading the material. The book had a certain 
fascination, but for a negative reason. The prologue promised, I 
thought, some useful insights into the judicial process. As I moved 
through the essays, however, I was disappointed by what seemed to 
be their thinness of content. To be fair, information of historical 
interest is provided in several places, particularly Chapters 1 and 2. 
In addition, Chapter 12 challenged a belief that I and many practic-
ing lawyers have supposed to be grounded in fact. But overall the 
collection remains, in my judgment, substantively lean. 
I 
I confess that I have always doubted the ability of scholars to 
discover otherwise unobserved large truths about judicial behavior 
by counting votes. The editors emphasize that the studies rely prin-
cipally on voting statistics, with no attention given to the content of 
opinions, or as they put it, to "the logical progression of legal argu-
ments proffered by judges to rationalize the policies they make." 
Nevertheless, I expected, perhaps unfairly, more than I found. 
Here I merely highlight the contents of each chapter. For organiza-
tional reasons, I will postpone comment on Chapters 1 and 4. 
In Chapter 2, S. Sidney Ulmer explores the number of 
nonunanimous opinions and the incidence of dissent by the Chief 
Justices in cases decided by the Supreme Court from the tenure of 
John Marshall through that of Earl Warren. After testing and re-
jecting a number of hypotheses that might explain different rates of 
nonunanimity and dissent by the Chiefs (age and experience, con-
gressional attacks on the Court, etc.), Ulmer concludes that the 
three most important variables are the complexity of the cases, the 
turnover on the Court, and the number of presidents who appointed 
the members of the Court. He suggests a host of other interesting 
hypotheses. The tables provide a convenient and interesting sum-
mary of the frequency of dissents during various eras. 
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In Chapter 3, Edward V. Heck explores Changing Voting Pat-
terns in the Warren and Burger Courts. Much of this chapter is 
descriptive, showing the shifting alignments of the Justices as new 
appointees tilted the balance from time to time. Heck concludes 
that the appointment process can be used to change the direction of 
the Court. As he puts it, the changes that have occurred in voting 
patterns, such as Justice Brennan's movement from an extraordi-
narily high majority participation rate to a position of isolation 
from the 111ainstream, lend support to the proposition that the 
Court ultimately reflects the policy preferences of the same domi-
nant national coalitions that elect presidents. 
In Chapter 5, Donald R. Songer discusses Factors Affecting Va-
riation in Rates of Dissent in the U.S. Courts of Appeal. Focusing on 
full-opinion labor and criminal cases for about a twenty-year pe-
riod, Songer tested ten hypotheses. He reports that he found no 
evidence for any hypothesis that would explain changes in dissent 
rates over time. Factors he found to have some significance in ex-
plaining high rates of dissent included the presence of difficult legal 
issues, ideological diversity on panels, urbanism, reversals of deci-
sions below, and the policy direction of the decisions. He says he 
was surprised to find no evidence for the belief expressed by judges 
that a heavy workload reduces the rate of dissent. 
Chapter 6, Parameters of Dissent, by Justin V. Green, was writ-
ten principally for scholars interested in quantitative analysis of ju-
dicial behavior. He suggests research models and approaches with 
special reference to the problems of measuring disagreement among 
panels of judges in unanimous cases, i.e., intracircuit inconsistency. 
Green provides a useful summary of staffing and organizational 
changes in the courts of appeal during the last two decades. 
In Chapter 7, Stephen L. Washy writes Of Judges, Hobgoblins 
and Small Minds: Dimensions of Disagreement in the Ninth Circuit. 
He discusses inconsistency among circuit panels but mixes in de-
scriptions of previous studies of conflict measured by dissent. He 
summarizes some conclusions drawn from earlier works: district 
judges, circuit judges from outside a circuit, and senior circuit 
judges sitting on courts of appeal panels over a four year period filed 
substantially fewer dissenting and concurring opinions than a cir-
cuit's regular judges, with district judges filing the fewest. Judges 
sitting by designation were "less for labor, more for the government 
in tax cases, and less for criminal defendants making a constitu-
tional claim." 
In his study of the Ninth Circuit for the present book, Washy 
compared dissent rates on panels, making what seems to be every 
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possible comparison among panels according to their composition 
(regular judges, visiting judges, senior circuit judges, district and 
senior district judges). Armed with a computer, he even looked at 
panels that included circuit judges who were formerly district 
judges. Washy concludes that the "overall level of agreement for 
the six years [studied] was roughly the same for all combinations of 
judges other than three circuit judges .... " It is surprising to me, in 
light of the earlier conclusions, that Washy's tables show a slightly 
higher level of agreement for Ninth Circuit panels consisting of 
three regular circuit judges than for other combinations. 
Chapter 8, by Charles M. Lamb, provides A Micro/eve/ Analy-
sis of Appeals Court Conflict: Warren Burger and his Colleagues of 
the D. C. Circuit. Lamb tests some hypotheses relating to the court 
of appeal that has had the highest rate of dissent, especially in crim-
inal cases. He also examines some hypotheses concerning Burger's 
disagreement with various colleagues while Burger sat on that 
court. Among his findings is confirmation of an "important find-
ing" by others that there is more conflict when a court of appeal 
reverses a district court than when it affirms. 
This was true in the D.C. Circuit, however, only for panel (as 
distinguished from en bane) decisions. Turning to Burger, Lamb 
set out to test whether background characteristics of judges affect 
their decisionmaking. His hypothesis, building from earlier studies 
showing that judges who are Democrats and either Catholic or Jew-
ish are more liberal than judges who are Republicans and Protes-
tant, was that Burger would be in greatest voting conflict with 
judges who were Democrats and either Catholic or Jewish. To his 
surprise, Lamb found that Burger's agreement rate was 53.5 percent 
with seven other Protestants and 52.1 percent with six Catholic or 
Jewish judges. Party affiliation was far more important; it linked 
with agreement rates of 81.5 percent (Republicans) and 47.6 per-
cent (Democrats). Admitting that his focus on these two variables 
was not "methodologically sophisticated," Lamb considered voting 
alignments during different time frames and for different criminal 
law issues. He found that Burger's alignments shifted or evolved 
over time, and that on certain issues his alignment changed, tending 
to reverse the order of judges with whom he had high and low rates 
of conflict. 
The remaining chapters deal with voting patterns on state high 
courts. In Chapter 9, Henry R. Glick and George W. Pruet, Jr. 
review rates of dissent in all fifty states over a period spanning 65 
years. They find that the overall rate of dissent in state high courts 
has been rising, especially since about 1966, but that very high 
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levels of dissent are still the exception. In an effort to locate factors 
affecting dissent, they calculated correlations between dissent rates 
and a host of variables collected under three major headings: social 
and economic complexity; political complexity and competition; 
and complexity of court structure. Among the variables grouped 
under the first heading are percent nonagricultural employment, 
percent black population, and median income; among the second 
heading variables are total state expenditures (1978), percent Dem-
ocratic vote for governor, and percent majority party lower house 
(1978). They found that the presence of an intermediate appellate 
court in the state's system and the level of state expenditures corre-
lated more closely with dissent rates than any other variable. 
"When all states are examined, total state expenditures is the single 
best prediction of dissent." 
In Chapter 10, Victor E. Flango, Craig R. Ducat and R. Neal 
McKnight attempt to measure leadership through opinion assign-
ment in the supreme courts of Michigan and Pennsylvania. They 
chose the periods of 1956-62 for the Michigan court and 1961-71 
for Pennsylvania. Sidney Ulmer had studied the Michigan deci-
sions for 1958-62 and concluded that Justice Kavanaugh was the de 
facto leader of Chief Justice Dethmer's court. In the present study 
the authors use statistical methods somewhat different from those of 
Ulmer. They also exclude unanimous opinions, which Ulmer in-
cluded. They conclude that Justice Smith was the leader after ana-
lyzing only cases in which dissents were filed. The figures for 
Pennsylvania present a less clear picture, but the "Inter-Individual 
Solidarity Index," suggested by the authors as the best indicator of 
leadership in the majority, puts Justice Eagen at the top and Justice 
Musmanno at the bottom. The "Shapley-Shubic Index," on the 
other hand, would rank Musmanno as the most powerful of the 
judges. 
Chapter 11 is A Longitudinal Study of the Docket Composition 
Theory of Conflict and Consensus, based on the decisions of the Ari-
zona Supreme Court from 1913 to 1976. Author John H. Stookey 
classified the cases as criminal or civil, private law or public law. 
He determined that with the exception of two periods, changes in 
the court's docket have had an impact on dissent rates in Arizona, 
finding some covariance between dissent rates and percentages of 
cases containing a public law issue. Of the periods that were excep-
tions to this conclusion, one is explained by the presence of a maver-
ick judge. The other period may be explained by a change in the 
court's size. 
The final chapter presents an interesting study of the relation-
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ship between the California Supreme Court's exercise of discretion-
ary review and its attitude toward the merits of the cases granted 
review. The author, Robert L. Dudley, concludes that disagree-
ment among the justices is substantially greater when they vote to 
grant or deny review than when they decide the merits of the re-
viewed cases. This suggests that linkage between the justices' votes 
on access and on the merits is weak; votes in favor of access are not 
generally based on a deci!'ion to overturn the case on the merits. 
There is, however, substantial disagreement among the justices, 
based on different role perceptions, concerning the appropriate cri-
teria for this decision. These findings relate to the whole sample of 
cases analyzed and more strongly to those cases, proportionately 
large in number, where a decision on the merits is unanimous. 
Dudley finds a significant correlation between the justices' votes on 
access and on the merits for those cases in which conflict on the 
merits is evident. As that conflict increases (larger number of dis-
senting votes on the merits) the correlation grows stronger. 
II 
In the prologue the editors distinguish the mainstay of the col-
lection-quantitative analysis of voting statistics-from "small 
group analysis." They define the latter as an approach that "typi-
cally involves exploring interpersonal relationships on courts as re-
vealed by such data sources as the private papers of deceased 
judges." While acknowledging that small group analysis has made 
"major contributions to the study of judicial conflict," they point 
out that quantitative analysis has the virtue of being more objective. 
Moreover, they claim, "the chapters in this volume go beyond ques-
tions of judicial interaction and influence." 
Despite that introduction, the editors chose for Chapter 1 a 
piece by David Danelski that relies heavily on the docket books of 
Justice Douglas during four terms of court and the private papers of 
eight Justices who served during the same terms. Danelski also an-
alyzed the content of cases in an effort to isolate decisions that in his 
opinion turned on the Justices' role expectations-activism versus 
restraint or adherence to precedent. He describes the chapter as an 
exploratory effort to determine the causes and consequences of con-
flict and its resolution in the Supreme Court. 
Danelski concludes that Supreme Court decisions turn on the 
interaction of the Justices' values and role expectations and, to a 
lesser extent, on differences in their perception of issues. Defining 
leadership as the ability to reconcile these differences, Danelski 
finds that Justice Black scored the highest (and Frankfurter the 
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lowest) as a leader, while Chief Justice Hughes was a more able 
leader than Stone. By a combination of references to private papers, 
shepardization of cases, and analysis of the content of opinions, 
Danelski tentatively concludes that concurring opinions have little 
impact on later constitutional developments, although a concur-
rence (or a potential concurrence) may influence the content of a 
majority opinion. Dissenting opinions often have significant policy 
consequences by affecting the content of majority opinions, and by 
persuasively calling attention to questionable uses of precedent. 
The last conclusion is based largely on the extent to which the dis-
senting opinions surveyed became the articulated bases for later, 
overruling decisions. 
A dissent necessarily reflects disagreement. But not all disa-
greement results in dissent. Different judges experience different 
levels of intensity of disagreement, and differing role perceptions af-
fect the level at which each will file dissenting opinions. Professor 
Danelski's observations about values and role and issue perception 
have the sound of reality, as do the quotations from Ninth Circuit 
judges in Chapter 7: 
'Some judges have higher thresholds of indignation' than others, particularly in the 
area of search and seizure: 'Some feel all wiretapping is evil and resolve all cases 
against the government'; others resolve all cases for the government, 'which is try-
ing to protect us .. .' When judges have 'different notions of justice' that 'reflect 
different approaches in society,' they cannot be convinced to change their minds 
about such notions, which also serve to color their perceptions about facts and how 
they apply the law to the facts. 
These generalizations are sound, but they can be drawn from 
reading opinions and listening to judges; they do not require quanti-
tative research. I am not sure how far "beyond questions of judicial 
interaction and influence" quantitative research that avoids analysis 
of opinion content can take us. Be that as it may, the present collec-
tion did not carry me very far. Moreover, I am confused about the 
ultimate purpose of the individual chapters and of the collection as 
a whole. 
In the prologue the editors offer several reasons why it is im-
portant to study judicial conflict and consensus, but all their cita-
tions to support or illustrate their reasons are to existing literature. 
They do not tie any chapter in the book to any reason for such 
study. Writing about models for behavioralist study of the judici-
ary, Professor Charles Sheldon said, "The purpose of models and, 
for that matter, of scientific inquiry generally, is to organize, ana-
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lyze, predict, and explain political phenomena."4 Organization and 
analysis are means to the ends of explaining, understanding and 
predicting. There is an abundance of organization and analysis in 
this collection, but I found practically nothing that would help ex-
plain or predict judicial behavior in a useful way, certainly nothing 
that could not be gleaned from even a casual reading of opinions. 
Consider some examples. Burger often disagreed with Baze-
lon; but in certain types of cases they often agreed with each other. 
About what, precisely, could they be counted on to agree? In the 
Ninth Circuit the disagreement rate does not change much regard-
less of the combination of judges on panels, if votes over a suffi-
ciently long period of time are considered. A year is certainly not 
long enough because we learn in Chapter 7 that in 1974 "the combi-
nation showing the highest overall disagreement was that of circuit 
judge, senior circuit judge and senior district judge. . . . That this 
category of panel registered very little disagreement the following 
year, 1975, with none in unpublished cases, is illustrative ofyear-by-
year fluctuation. " 5 Perhaps it is more useful to know that rates of 
dissent relate to the presence of public law cases on the docket-if 
the court is a state court of a certain size and has no mavericks on 
it-or to the level of state expenditures, than it would be useful to 
know-if it were true-that they relate to above normal rates of 
rainfall. Perhaps. 
The problems stemming from a complete divorce between con-
sideration of opinion content and research about judicial decision-
making are pervasive in this collection of studies. Some authors 
move beyond rates of dissent to study conflict as a direct means of 
discovering predictive information. But this requires the identifica-
tion or creation of surrogates for cause and effect, surrogates that 
tend to be one-dimensional. If, unlike Danelski, an author ignores 
what judges say in their opinions, or privately to each other, he 
must develop some factors to stand in for "liberal" and "conserva-
4. C. SHELDON, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL PROCESS: MODELS AND APPROACHES 
229 (1974). 
5. The data collected for the Ninth Circuit cannot explain the past or predict the 
future in specific cases and panel combinations. My one experience with the panel combina-
tion referred to above (not in the Ninth or my present Sixth Circuit) was a bitter, unlucky 
one. The regular circuit judge dominated oral argument, though questions put by the senior 
district judge suggested, with hindsight, that he should have dissented from the decision ulti-
mately authored by the circuit judge. Neither he nor the senior circuit judge dissented from 
the reversal of the trial judge, a respected, dedicated judge who had worked on the case over a 
period of six years. Two other circuit judges filed a strong, biting dissent from the whole 
court's refusal to rehear the case en bane. Two more responded with a brief opinion support-
ing the refusal to rehear. 
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tive" outcomes, a judge's values and perceptions, activism and re-
straint, etc. 
Judges are classified according to party and religion, and some 
correlations are found if enough decisions and enough judges are 
surveyed. But known alignments-Brennan-Warren, Brennan-
Marshall, Frankfurter-Harlan-remind us of the limits of general-
izations. In the Arizona study (Chapter 11), the judges of the Ari-
zona Supreme Court over a sixty year period were 95% Democrat 
and for several "natural courts" looked like clones of one another. 
The author noted that more sensitive measures of ideology than 
background analysis and party affiliation are needed. If prediction 
of a new judge's behavior is the goal, we will need measures sensi-
tive enough to reflect the ways in which judicial experience shapes 
the values and perceptions that the appointee brings to the bench. 
If understanding judges while they are on the bench is the goal, the 
most revealing clues will probably be found in their opinions. 
III 
Chapter 4 provides a case in point. In this chapter, Harold 
Spaeth and Michael Atfeld attack (I chose the word carefully) Jus-
tice Frankfurter's reputation for judicial restraint. Spaeth's earlier 
research, in their words, "demonstrated that Frankfurter's restraint 
was thoroughly subordinated to his substantive attitudes towards 
business and labor." For this book, they analyze nonunanimous 
cases dealing with state and federal agency regulation of business 
and labor during Frankfurter's tenure on the Warren Court. The 
authors disclaim any "content analysis of the justices' opinions," 
but they do classify the cases according to outcome. For example, 
in a state regulation of labor case, any opinion supporting state reg-
ulation, whether majority or dissenting, is classified as pro-state and 
"concomitantly" anti-union. By the same token, opinions opposing 
state regulation are characterized as pro-union. 
With positions thus staked out, the authors count the instances 
when the Justices voted pro-state/anti-union and vice-versa, NLRB 
pro-union/anti-union, and so on. They also tabulate interagree-
ment percentages and indices of interagreement among various 
groups of Justices. They conclude, one could say with a vengeance, 
that Frankfurter was an activist Justice motivated in his decision-
making by pro-business, anti-union values.6 
The state regulation of labor cases are identified only as twelve 
6. Subjectivity crept into Chapter 4. The authors speak of Frankfurter's "apologists"; 
his "greed" in assigning opinions to himself at every opportunity; the "Pontius Pilate posture 
adopted" by him in Lion Oil; and his "rush-to-judgment activism" in SL Joe Paper. 
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cases, eleven of which involved federal preemption of state court 
jurisdiction over union conduct. Frankfurter took a position in 
most of these cases that allowed state court jurisdiction. 
The focus on nonunanimous cases in this context is fraught 
with problems. I for one am not interested in whether Frankfurter 
or any other Justice is grossly characterized as an activist or 
restraintist. In relation to whom? To what values, grounded in 
what sources? By ignoring unanimous decisions the authors obscure 
the fact that Frankfurter often supported federal preemption of 
state regulation of labor activities, so that by their definition he was 
often pro-union. Indeed, one of the most sweeping statements of 
preemption doctrine was authored by Frankfurter in San Diego 
Building Trades Council v. Garmon. 1 
Their focus on nonunanimous cases allowed the authors to 
posit that in every such case decisional choice was available. They 
then characterized the choice as one governed by pro- and anti-
union values. In the cases surveyed, "Frankfurter was obviously in 
greatest voting conflict with these three justices. (Douglas, Black 
and Warren). Only [they] proved to be pro-union." (Did they also 
prove to be the restraintists on the Court?) 
Most of the cases surveyed in this study can be identified by 
going through the U.S. Reports. They deal with issues that fall be-
yond or at the outer limits of the boundaries of any federal preemp-
tion doctrine that rationally could be attributed to congressional 
intent or federal statutory policy. One series of cases, generically 
referred to in later opinions as "the violence cases," dealt with state 
lawsuits to enjoin or obtain compensatory damages for alleged vio-
lence or threats of violence by labor organizations. The conduct 
generally could have been charged as unfair labor practices under 
federal law, but the NLRB has limited remedial powers. A major-
ity of the Court ruled that in these cases state remedial powers are 
not preempted by federallaw.s Another case in which the key was 
the limited remedial power of the NLRB is International Associa-
tion of Machinists v. Gonzales.9 In an opinion by Frankfurter, the 
Court ruled that a member's wrongful expulsion by his union, for 
7. 359 u.s. 236 (1959). 
8. United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656 
(1954) (allowing an employee to maintain a state tort action for losses stemming from vio-
lence or threats of same by a union; Douglas and Black dissenting); Auto Workers v. Wiscon-
sin Employment Relations Board, 351 U.S. 266 (1956) (same, but remedy of injunction; 
Warren, Black and Douglas dissenting); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) 
(same as Auto Workers; Warren, Black and Douglas dissenting); Automobile Workers v. 
Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (allowing employee to bring a state tort action alleging force and 
threats of violence by union; Warren and Douglas dissenting). 
9. 356 U.S. 617 (1958) (Warren and Douglas dissenting). 
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which federal law provided no remedy, could be the subject of a 
state contract action. 
Three other cases are in a different vein. In United Mine 
Workers of America v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co.w the union had 
not complied with congressionally imposed filing requirements and 
was denied recourse to the protections of the federal labor laws. 
The Court ruled nevertheless that those laws preempted state law. 
Frankfurter dissented because he was unable to see how state law 
could conflict with congressionally established labor policy under 
the circumstances. Two other cases involved state court actions 
that settled preemption doctrine prohibited. In one, the union 
sought a federal court injunction against the state court proceed-
ing.'' In the other, the NLRB, after its remedial machinery was 
put in motion, sought the injunction in federal court against the 
state court proceeding.12 The trouble was that a federal statute on 
the books since 1793 prohibited a federal court from enjoining state 
court proceedings.l3 Very limited exceptions to the act were added 
in 1948. In the NLRB's case Justice Douglas wrote for the Court 
and upheld the injunction, giving only cursory attention to the 
Anti-Injunction Act. Justice Black alone dissented. In the union 
case, Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Court and ruled that the 
Anti-Injunction Act applied. Warren, Douglas, and Black dis-
sented. (Douglas later developed a broader rationale for cases 
where the NLRB seeks the injunction, a rationale that even more 
clearly than his first one would not encompass an injunction sought 
by a union.l4 He relied on a Frankfurter opinion in a non-labor 
case.) In three other nonunanimous preemption cases, Frankfurter 
was in the majority, ruling against the state and for preemption, 
with Burton and Clark dissenting.'s 
Unanimous decisions do not negate the existence of decisional 
choice; and nonunanimous decisions do not prove the existence of 
equally legitimate choices. The cases studied only prove that 
Frankfurter was unwilling to vote for unions in all cases at all costs. 
If that is the authors' definition of anti-unionism, they make their 
point. 
An additional problem is due to the authors' choice of preemp-
10. 351 u.s. 62 (1956). 
I I. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Brothers Co., 348 U.S. 511 (1955). 
12. Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954). 
13. 28 u.s.c. § 2283. 
14. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971). 
15. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. I (1957); Amalgamated Meat Cut-
ters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957) (Garmon I). 
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tion as a subject matter. With the exception of the Anti-Injunction 
Act cases, the cases chosen dealt with situations in which plaintiffs 
were asserting that unions are subject to the same state laws that 
govern everyone. Paramount federal law can supplant or oust state 
law, but the Court traditionally looks for congressional intent on 
the issue; in the absence of any expressed legislative intent the Court 
turns to an analysis of conflict or the potential for conflict between 
specific state laws and federal policy. This analysis must include 
consideration of the interests of the persons affected. Except indi-
rectly in the Oak Flooring case, and directly in the Anti-Injunction 
Act cases, Congress had expressed no intention regarding preemp-
tion in the governing laws in force when the above cases were de-
cided. Should the state laws governing the "violence cases" have 
been preempted? Even the unions have not asserted on a broad 
front that the states' criminal laws are ousted by federal labor laws. 
And the local police, not the F.B.I., have generally dealt with vio-
lence on the picket line. Unions have not claimed that federal law 
protects violence. To take extreme cases, an employer that loses its 
plant and an employee who loses his physical integrity to union vio-
lence can obtain, respectively, a cease and desist order and an award 
of lost wages, if any, from the NLRB. Compensatory remedies are 
provided by state law. If, in the absence of any legislative guidance, 
one judge rules that federal law ousts state tort law of general appli-
cability and another rules that it does not, who is the activist? The 
one judge might be regarded as pro-union. The other judge is not 
necessarily anti-union; he can ground his opinion in a commitment 
(activist? restraintist?) to the rule of law. No one doubts that val-
ues affect decisions in these kinds of cases. But outcome alone does 
not reliably isolate the influential values. 
The authors give a nod to possible values of federalism in the 
preemption cases, but move on to bolster their central theme in the 
business and federal agency cases. Only a handful of these are iden-
tified-by name, without citation-and it would be a laborious task 
to isolate the total samples. But enough case names are provided to 
show the misleading possibilities of pursuing a one-dimensional, 
which-party-won style of decision cataloguing.t6 
16. The state regulation of business cases include a large number of commerce clause-
state taxation of business cases; the NLRB cases involve a range of issues, including the 
proper functioning of the Board, giving content to the broadly worded federal labor legisla-
tion, and interpreting statutory language that is not substantially ambiguous. An example of 
the last is Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). Chief Justice Warren wrote 
the opinion and Frankfurter dissented. One of Warren's most admiring biographers used this 
case to illustrate how Warren was guided by his polestar of fairness. The biographer agreed 
with Frankfurter's charge that Warren had substituted his sense of fairness for the legislative 
1987] BOOK REVIEW 493 
IV 
In 1974, Charles H. Sheldon summed up a debate within the 
political science fraternity between "traditionalists" and "behavi-
oralists." The debate appears to have peaked during the 1960s. He 
wrote: 
This debate has been leveled at the question of the use of values in research and 
at the methodologies common to the behavioralists. The dialogue takes a scientific 
versus non- or antiscientific perspective, with the behavioralist claiming that the 
traditionalist fails to be scientific enough, and the traditionalist arguing that the 
behavioralist confuses science with methodology .... Robert McCloskey has ob-
served " ... that the fraternity in general is now receptive to the methods and in-
sights ofbehavioralism in so far as it finds them helpful; ... and that the discipline 
is about ready for a new movement .... " 
The new movement is upon us. . . . The post-behavioral revolution in political 
science demands that we be concerned for the contemporary world and its problems 
even if we must sacrifice some of our scientific rigor. In Easton's words, " ... it is 
better to be vague than non-relevantly precise." ... In describing, explaining, and 
predicting what is and eschewing the ought, [the behavioralist] tends to support the 
existing conditions in the world. The realties of the political world tend to be lost in 
the abstract context of models and data collection.l7 
It is not evident from Judicial Conflict and Consensus that its 
editors and contributors were daunted by Sheldon's last sentence. 
Because I was perplexed by my own inability to discern the purpose 
or utility of much of the research reported in the collection, I paid 
attention to the suggested agendas, in almost every chapter and in 
an epilogue, for "further research." Suspecting that the studies re-
ported were intended to be incremental, I hoped that the research 
agendas would help me to see the larger canvas on which they were 
to be increments. Unfortunately, however, most of the agendas 
called for more of the same. 
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Nearly thirty years ago, a biologist of my acquaintance, on 
learning that I planned to study philosophy, said something that 
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